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the Editor. Accidents 
1. Partial amputation of the left hand of 
an operator when working on a slitter 
At about 6.50 p.m., the main operative responsible for 
slitting line B was informed by  a binder of a surface 
defect in the slit strip which had just been fed into the 
recoiler. 
After stopping the line, he found the defect on the in-
ner surface of the third strip from the operative's side. 
From experience, he assumed that there was a fault in 
the lower knife block at the slitting stand. 
He asked the second operative to take over control of 
the line and to actuate the slitter with stops and starts 
manually whilst he moved his left hand, protected by a 
glove,  upstream  of  the  slitter,  over  the  knives  and 
neoprene  spacers  in  order to  find  the  cause of the 
marking. 
During this operation his hand was drawn into the slit-
ter. 
On  hearing  the  victim's cries,  the second  operative 
left the manual controls and pressed the emergency 
stop button. The main operative's hand was partially 
amputated. 
It should be  noted that when actuated manually, the 
slitter is rotated by impulses, the length of which de-
pends on  the time during which actuation is maintai-
ned.  It  may vary from 1/4 to 1 complete revolution of 
the knives, representing a slitting length of about 1m. 
Planned action: 
-Written instructions to be obeyed by the workforce 
at  all  times. This calls for special  supervision on 
the part of the foremen and supervisors. 
- Study of the various means of limiting the speed of 
rotation  of  the  slitter  knives  and  other  similar 
equipment at in-running nips of strip finishing in-
stallations. 
- Study of the idea proposed by the rolling and finish-
ing service: elimination of the pinch rolls upstream 
of the slitting stand and installation of the vertical 
guides as closely as possible to the latter, prevent-
ing  any intervention by the operative upstream of 
the stand. 
Safety instructions 
Work and checks to be carried out on machinery with 
in-running nips, such as the slitting stand, pinch rolls, 
etc. 
All  visual checks on  moving machinery must be  car· 
ried out downstream. 
All accessories obstructing the operative's vision dur-
ing checks must be withdrawn once the machine has 
been  stopped  (trimming  scrap  chutes  on  slitting 
stands, for example). 
To  have a clear view of the lower parts of machinery 
(lower pinch  rolls,  lower knife blocks, etc.)  the  strip 
must be removed from the machine being checked. 
As a reminder: 
- It is strictly forbidden to carry out checks on  ma-
chinery in motion; 
- Procedures for shutting down and locking out ma-
chinery must be strictly adhered to. 
2.  Fatal  burns  caused  by  hydrofluoric 
acid 
On  the pickling line in a steelworks the supply elbow 
of the hydrofluoric acid  line was removed  in  prepar-
ation for repair work. The flow of acid through the pipe 
was cut off by a three-way valve.  For safety reasons, 
after the supply elbow had been removed the line was 
blanked off at eye level with a blind flange. The length 
of  pipe  between  the  three-way  valve  and  the  blind 
flange was some 20 metres. This was the situation for 
22 days until the repair was completed as planned, af-
ter which the supply elbow was to be re-installed by a 
foreman and two fitters. 
On  the day of the accident the foreman checked that 
the three-way valve was still in the same position, and 
then  left with one of the fitters to fetch pipe clamps 
and screws. Meanwhile the second fitter was instruc-
ted  to  bring  the  necessary  acid-proof  protective 
clothing. Instead of doing this the fitter began to loosen 
the nearest bolts securing the blind flange. This allo-
wed a small amount of hydrofluoric acid to spurt from 
the  flange  for a  short  period  onto the  man's head, 
throat and  neck.  Obviously pressure had  built up in 
the line during the down-time period, so that the acid 
was forced out when the blind flange was loosened, 
although  the  reason  for  the  pressure  build-up  has 
never been explained. Workmates who were not invol-
. ved in this operation gave the fitter first aid, removing 
his clothing and rinsing the affected areas with copi-
ous amounts of water. The man was then taken to a 
nearby  hospital, which had  the  special medications 
required  and  the  company medical  officer gave  de-
tailed instructions for treatment. In  spite of the small 
amount  involved  and  the correct  first aid  treatment 
and  immediate  intensive  care  by  the  doctors,  the 
patient died in shock some five hours later. In order to 
prevent a repetition of this accident, when repairs are 
carried out to similar lines which have been taken out 
of  use,  an  additional  sealed  stopcock  and  a  man-
ometer will be fitted. 
This will enable the pressure in the line to be checked 
and  relieved  under control before the blind flange is 
removed.  In  addition the  attention of all  employees 
was again drawn to the instructions and information 
with which they were already familiar regarding work-
ing  on  acid  lines  and  in  particular the  handling of 
hydrofluoric acid, namely: 
(i)  the  correct  protective  clothing  must  always  be 
worn; 
(ii)  the protective clothing must be acid-proof and not 
merely acid-resistant; 
(iii) protective  goggles  are  inadequate  for  handling 
hydrofluoric acid; 
(iv) under no  circumstances must contaminated  art-
icles of clothing be removed with bare hands. 
If there  are  no showers in  areas  where  hydrofluoric 
acid is handled, extinguishers suitable for use on men 
must be provided. Comment 
Hydrofluoric acid is an aqueous solution of hydrogen 
fluoride and is used for the surface treatment of spe-
cial steels. 
One of its distinguishing properties in use is the very 
high degree of penetration which it achieves. In  con-
tact with the  skin  it does not merely cause surface 
burns but it very quickly destroys all the subcutane· 
ous  tissue,  sometimes down  to the  bone.  Even  the 
smallest burns are very painful. 
Because of the high penetration rate of hydrofluoric 
acid acute resorptive poisoning can occur, even after 
intensive rinsing of the skin. Fluorine bonds with cal-
cium and iron ions, inhibiting vital enzymes and caus-
ing dangerous metabolic damage.  It  can also cause 
convulsions  (tetany),  ventricular fibrillation and  car-
diac arrest. According to the literature the fatal dose 
by resorption appears to be as low as 2.5  grams, i.e. 
3-4  ml of the solution commonly used in  the steel in· 
dustry for pickling. The boiling point of hydrogen fluo-
ride is 19.9° C, and inhalation of large quantities of the 
fumes can also be fatal. 
As a result of this accident two methods of treatment 
for hydrofluoric acid burns have been  recommended 
by  the  German  medical  profession  and  further  in-
formation  is  available  from  the  Secretariat  of  the 
General Commission on Health and Safety (DG V),  Lu-
xembourg  in  the  following  languages:  English, 
French, German and Italian. 
A group of medical officers from the German steel in· 
dustry is studying the problem and would be pleased 
to  exchange  information  on  this  subject  with  col· 
leagues in other countries. The address is: 
Referat Arbeitsmedizin, 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung der 
Eisen- und Stahlindustrie 
Breitestrasse 69 
D-4000 Dusseldorf 1 
3.  Multiple  accident  in  an  arc  furnace 
shop 
Shortly after tapping a 100-tonne UHP electric arc fur-
nace,  cooling water leakage was detected on  a sec-
tion of the roof. The duty foreman  inspected the da-
mage and gave instructions to reduce the water sup-
ply to the leaking section of the roof and then proceed 
with tapping of the furnace. There was no reason why 
this should not have been done, as the small quantity 
of water emanating from the  leak evaporated imme-
diately on  contact with the  molten charge.  Tapping 
was completed without incident and the water supply 
to the leaking section of the roof and the roofcore was 
cut off and  the electrodes were removed.  Forty min· 
utes later repairs were started, which first of all  en-
tailed  removing  the  roofcore  with  the  EOT  crane. 
When  the roofcore had  been  lifted approximately 40 
em  a small explosion ensued, followed immediately 
by a larger one, injuring seven furnacemen and main  ten· 
ance staff, three of whom were hospitalized. 
The  accident was caused by residual  water running 
out of the leaking section of the roof into the furnace 
where there were still molten residues. A furnaceman 
stated  that,  when  the  explosion  occurred,  the  slag 
blanket had cooled to the extent that it was black. The 
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explosion was probably triggered by a piece of slag 
falling from the roof or wall of the furnace and break-
ing  through  the  slag  blanket.  It  is  considered  likely 
that  water  had  penetrated  the  slag  underneath  the 
solidified slag blanket. 
To avoid accidents of this sort, all work on the furnace 
is  now  prohibited  as  long  as  it may contain water. 
Work on  the roof should, as far as possible, only be 
carried out when it has been swung out. In designing 
water-cooled roofs, particular attention is to be  paid 
to improving water-tight sealing and reducing suscep-
tibility to leaks. 
4. Crushed between buffers 
In the slag processing plant of a steelworks three cars 
with full slag pots were being positioned for discharg-
ing.  This  entailed  shunting a  scrap car loaded  with 
skull back up the track. 
One of the slag processing staff, whose job was to as-
sist in  connecting the slag pots to a crane, stepped 
onto the track between the head of the slag pot train 
and the scrap wagon, not noticing that the scrap wa-
gon, which had been shunted up the track, was now 
slowly rolling backwards. He was caught between the 
buffers as the car hit him and sustained fatal injuries. 
Although the crane driver had recognized the danger, 
he could not warn him in time. 
The  accident occurred  because  no steps  had  been 
taken to prevent the scrap car being moved acciden· 
tally, as works' directives require. 
The car could also have been coupled to the slag pot 
train, but this precaution was not taken. 
5.  Fatal accident caused by overloading 
a platform wagon 
After  loading  pipes  onto  a  platform  wagon  with 
stanchions  used  for transport within  the  works,  an 
operator was about to drive the wagon into the adja· 
cent building when one of the uppermost pipes rolled 
over the stanchions on the side where the control unit 
was located and hit him. He sustained severe injuries 
and died shortly afterwards. 
This accident, which had such serious consequences, 
occurred because, contrary to works' directives, the 
transporter was  overloaded and  pipes were  stacked 
higher than the top of the stanchions. 
Schematic  illustration  showing  how  overloading  the  plat· 
form wagon caused an accident. 6.  Loader crushed to death 
Whilst a train comprising 17 self-tipping wagons with 
their discharge flaps still open was being shunted, a 
loader was crushed  to death  between the wall  of a 
lime silo plant and a discharge flap. The driver and the 
foreman  shunter had agreed to move the train back 
out of the silo area temporarily, to allow a locomotive 
to carry out a shunting operation  in  this area,  after 
which the train was to be  shunted back. The loader, 
whose presence in an area which is neither a working 
nor  a  traffic  area  had  gone  unnoticed,  was  caught 
when the train was shunted back. 
This  accident prompts  us  to point out that wagons 
with open discharge flaps should not, as far as possi· 
ble,  be  shunted  from  one  point to another,  even  in 
areas which are neither working nor traffic areas.  If, 
however, exceptional circumstances require that the 
train  be  shunted  while  the  discharge flaps  are  still 
open, the foreman shunter, marshalling staff and the 
train driver must examine and safeguard the stretch of 
track concerned. 
The company will mount flexible guards to afford pro· 
tection where space is restricted. 
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The  distance  between  the  protective  wall  and  the  open 
unloading door at the site of the accident was 13 em. 
7. Flame emissions from an electric arc 
furnace 
An  emission of flame from an electric arc furnace in· 
flicted burn injuries to the hands, face and neck of an 
employee, who was walking through the furnace bay. 
The man had been walking through the bay in order to 
get  to  his office  in  the  traffic department.  He  was 
wearing a helmet and outdoor garments, not molten 
metal  clothing.  The  furnace  was  at  the  'pre-blow' 
stage of its production cycle at the time and oxygen 
was being admitted by a side port. After approximate-
ly 5 minutes of oxygen blowing a prolonged emission 
of flame of approximately 10 seconds' duration occur· 
red injuring the man. Furnace temperature was 1 565° 
C.  The  man's jacket caught fire and he  ran,  with his 
arms raised and head lowered to shield himself, from 
the  area.  Other employees extinguished  the  flames 
and made arrangements for the man to receive medi· 
cal attention. 
A panel  of enquiry,  investigating the circumstances 
surrounding this accident, discussed the practicabil· 
ity of controlling the emission of flames from furnac· 
es.  The  consensus  of opinion  was  that  such  emis· 
sions could not be controlled or even predicted. It was 
agreed that an active furnace must always be treated 
with respect and that at any time from half an hour af· 
ter power on until the furnace is tapped there can be 
an element of risk. 
Recommendations/Action 
1. Unauthorized persons not to be at floor level in the 
furnace bay near an active furnace. 
2. Suitable warning notices to this effect to be erected 
in the vicinity. 
3.  All  authorized  persons  must  wear  the  approved 
molten  metal clothing and  associated  equipment 
near an active furnace. 
8. Crane hits scaffolding 
An  EOT crane collided with, and damaged, scaffold· 
ing erected by contractors in  furtherance of mainte· 
nance work in a mill. No-one was injured. 
The incident occurred in the cold processing bay of a 
coil plate mill comprising two continuous cut-up lines 
and  a  caster  shear  area  serviced  by  five  overhead 
cranes. Contractors were engaged to work in the plant 
on  cable recovery. Approximately two weeks prior to 
the incident a contractors' permit to work was issued 
to the firm involved authorizing access to the plant. 
The  permit  to  work  indicated  that  sub-contractors 
would be  employed for the purpose of erecting scaf· 
folding. When the permit was signed by plant manage· 
ment it did not describe the  scaffolding work to be 
done. On the day prior to the accident members of the 
plant's site engineering verbally instructed the sub· 
contractors to build two scaffold towers for the use of 
the main contractors. The instructions related to the 
siting of the scaffolding and emphasized the fact that 
scaffold members should not protrude into the path of 
EOT cranes. These instructions were given to the scaf· 
folders by their supervisor. A  scaffold access tower 
was erected below the crane girder and alongside a 
main column to one side of the mill. An access ladder 
was  lashed  to the top tube of the tower which  pro· 
truded nine inches into the bay. One of the EOT cran· 
es moved past the scaffolding several times during its 
construction and was seen to be well clear of the edge 
of the column. None the less, a short time later, a dif· 
ferent crane was moving down the bay when it collided 
with the scaffold. As a result the ladder was broken 
and the scaffold was bent away from the column. 
3 The crane which collided with the scaffold tower had 
an  unusual construction in that its access step was 
built onto the side of the cab. This step cleared the 
columns by only three inches and an  attached hand 
rail by about nine inches. Because the other crane had 
travelled through the area without incident the scat-
folders formed the erroneous opinion that there was 
about 24 inches clearance between the cranes and the 
columns and as a result allowed the lashed ladder to 
project outside the line of the column by six inches 
and the top support tube by approximately nine inch· 
es.  Additionally,  Investigation showed  that the con· 
tractors' supervisory staff had not inspected the com· 
pleted scaffold tower. 
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Recommendations/Action 
1. Where  crane  clearance  is  of  vital  safety  in  work 
such as  this, the permit to work must state clearly 
that this is a mandatory requirement. 
2. In the event of work not being commenced within a 
reasonable time-scale of the issue of the permit to 
work or should the nature of the work change or be-
come  more  clearly defined  a  new  permit to work 
must be drawn up. 
3. Where a permit to work involves the erection of a 
structure which must not protrude into the path of 
overhead  cranes,  that  permit  to  work  must  state 
that the erectors of scaffolding must ensure that a 
supervisor  inspects the  scaffold  within  a  reason· 
able time-scale of its completion, and certainly be-
fore the end of the day on which it was commenced, 
irrespective of whether it is complete or not. We should like to thank Mr Vidal, the Assistant General Manager at So/mer, 
for supplying the information which enabled us to publish this article. 
Thariks are also due to Mr Franquin, who gave permission for reproduction 
of the illustration. 
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Safety at Sol mer 
Selmer, ever heard of it? 
Selmer is a steelworks operating since 1974 at Fos· 
sur-Mer on the Mediterranean coast of France. 
Selmer  is  a  high-capacity production  unit  with  two 
blast furnaces (4 000 000 tonnes of iron per year), two 
converters (3 800 000 tonnes of steel per year with one 
converter working) and a rolling mill (4 500 000 tonnes 
per year of steel sheet and strip). 
Selmer also has a workforce of almost 6 200 employ-
ees on  a 600  ha site; 220  engineers and managerial 
staff, 4100 workers, technicians and supervisory staff 
working in jobs in which they may be exposed to risk. 
The safety situation in 1979 
Although an improving trend was apparent at the end 
of 1978, the figures were still extremely worrying. The 
frequency rate (the number of accidents giving rise to 
at  least  one  day's  absence  from  work  per  miiUon 
hours worked) was close to 90,  one of the highest in 
the French steel industry. 
An  attempt was, of course, made to find solutions  ..  In 
order to identify and eliminate hazards, the supervis-
ory staff carried out a detailed analysis of the causes 
of  all  accidents  (whether  or  not  they  gave  rise  to 
absence from work).  In  order to assist and advise in 
this task, arrangements were made at the beginning 
of 1978 for one safety adviser to be constantly availa-
ble on each shift. 
These measures brought about an  improvement: the 
1979  frequency rate was 76.8.  However, this did not 
satisfy the  new  manager,  Mr Vidal,  who decided to 
take matters in hand personally. 
In  1982  the situation has been transformed. The fre-
quency'  rates have improved gradually, dropping from 
41.6  in  1980 to 22.6  in  1981,  while the monthly rates 
from January to June 1982 range about an average of 
less than 12. 
What happened at Selmer in 1980 to reduce the acci· 
dent rate? 
The  new  manager  introduced  a  number of  innova-
tions. 
In January: 
In  March: 
A social department was set up. 
Work began on training the supervisory 
staff for their role in the company's so-
cial policy. 
In April:  A  slide  show  with  commentary  was 
shown to a large proportion of the work-
force.  The  manager  appeared  on  the 
screen  in  the very first slide.  He com-
mented  on  the  Selmer  statistics  and 
appealed to everyone to give the matter 
thought and act accordingly. 
In July:  The  accident  report  procedure  was 
changed in order to bring management 
into the  circuit and  involve  it  in  acci-
dent prevention. 
In September: Assistants  were  appointed  at  shop 
level to aid the supervisory staff in any 
social problems which arose. 
First safety campaign 
At the very beginning of the year,  the safety depart-
ment, at the request of the manager, was instructed to 
make preparations for a large-scale operation: a cam-
paign  was  planned  and  prepared  by  an  advertising 
agency and was launched on 20 October 1980. 
A green emblem in the form of a heart with the slogan 
'Careful please!' and a comic strip character 'Gaston 
Ia Gaffe'' drawn by a Belgian artist, Franquin, appear-
ed on  the buildings and on a large number of display 
boards throughout the works. 
Posters and games, competitions, gadgets (pens, key-
holders, etc.)- the whole range of aids used in a nor-
mal advertising campaign was brought into play. 
A competition was run  for the children of the work-
force.  A  'Gaston  Ia  Gaffe' comic  book was  sent  to 
their homes and they were asked to colour it in  and 
Note: 'Gaffe' is French slang for 'Watch out!' The cartoon suggests: 
'Watch out! Be careful, please!' 
• Gaffe also means 'Blunder' In  French.  'Gaston Ia  Gaffe' would be 
'Billy Blunder' in  English. 
5 write the dialogue. The children of course asked their 
parents for advice. Prizes (bicycles, transistor radios, 
etc.) were awarded for the best entries and were distri-
buted at the Christmas party. 
In November:  A second slide show was shown to the 
whole workforce. The  manager, Mr Vi· 
dal, explained the campaign. 
A booklet setting industrial accidents in their general 
context and relating those occurring in the company 
to those In the steel industry in general was issued to 
all employees with a suitable explanation, as was a 
book of cartoons, 'The things that go wrong at Sol-
mer', with drawings by the cartoonist Franquin. 
A competition Involving the whole workforce began on 
1 December 1980. As part of a game, all the staff were 
asked  for  their opinions on  safety  problems.  Many 
prizes were awarded, the first being a trip for two to 
the Caribbean. 
At the end  of the campaign,  Mr Vidal  said:  'We had 
taken a step forward but above all what we had learnt 
was  that the  general  climate of opinion had  a  very 
marked  effect  on  accidents.  The  initial  campaign, 
however, had succeeded In mobilizing opinion for one 
month only. We had to find a method of holding atten-
tion over a longer period.' 
This led to the 'Team safety' competition, which ran 
from May 1981. 
Second campaign: 'Team safety' competition 
This competition is based on  the frequency rates for 
accidents giving rise to at  least one  day's absence 
from work. The workforce is divided into a number of 
groups. As soon as the results for a group are better 
than  the  works  average,  the  members  are  awarded 
points which can be exchanged for prizes. The rules 
are as follows. 
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1. The entire Sol mer staff will be divided into different 
teams,  whose  composition  may  change  over  a 
period of time. 
Workers who do not wish to take part in the com-
petition must inform their superiors in writing. 
2. The teams will be  formed within each division by 
the  administrative assistants, who  will  keep  the 
lists up to date. 
3. When a team has completed 35 000 hours of work 
without any lost-time accident, it will be awarded 
points for every further complete period of 10 000 
hours without lost-time accidents. Statutory and 
contractual  paid  holidays  are  regarded  as  time 
worked. 
As  from  1 October,  maternity leave  will  also  be 
considered as time worked. 
The  period of 35 000  hours mentioned above is a 
probation period reflecting the ratio 
1 000 000 
Selmer frequency rate for the last completed 
business quarter 
(rounded down to the next 5 000 hours) 
Example:  Frequency  rate  for  the  1st  quarter  in 
1981:27.97 
Probation period: 1 000 000/27.97 = 35 752 hours, 
rounded off to 35 000. 
4. The  number  of  points  thus  distributed  to  each 
member of the team will be as follows: 
- 100 points for each of the first three periods of 
10 000  hours  above  the  threshold  defined 
above; 
- 200  points  for  each  of the  three  succeeding 
periods; 
- 300 points for all periods thereafter. 
The number of points awarded to teams composed 
entirely of persons employed in the departments 
listed in the annex, where working conditions are 
such that the risk is slight, will be 10, 20 and 30 for 
each of the periods mentioned above. 
5. The points acquired by the members of a team will 
be credited to them as soon as the team has com-
pleted 10 000  hours of work without any lost-time 
accident. 
In  the course of this period of 10 000 hours, team 
members  who  have  been  absent  for  more  than 
25% of the time for any reason other than statut· 
ory or contractual holidays or maternity leave will 
not be entitled to these points. 
6. On  joining a  new team,  an  employee will  be  en-
titled to the points currently credited to the team 
he Is joining. 
7. When a team Is involved in a lost-time accident, it 
retains  the  points  already  awarded.  The  team 
starts again at the beginning of the competition in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in  Art-
Icles 3 and 4 of the present rules. 
8. The  points obtained may be  accumulated as  the 
individuals  concerned  see  fit  and  can  be  ex-
changed for items chosen from the Selmer 'Team 
safety' catalogue.  This  catalogue  may  be  modi-
fied. Employees may pool their points to obtain a 
given item. 
9. The competition will begin on 1 June 1981  and will 
run for a period of one year. 
At the end of the competition, teams which are in 
the  process of acquiring  points will  continue  to 
participate in the competition until they have com-
pleted the current period. 
The  competition  will  in  any  case  end  for  such 
teams  when  they  have  accumulated  sufficient 
points  to  obtain  the  catalogue  item  of  highest 
value. 
10. The initial points entitlement of each team will be 
calculated on  1 June 1981  with reference to the 
last lost-time accident (involving) a member of the 
team. 
11. Any practical difficulties arising during the start-
up phase of the competition will be settled by the 
safety department. 
12. These rules may be modified after a trial period of 
six months in the light of the experience acquired. 
Conclusion 
The  effect of all  this preventive and promotional ac· 
tivity on the industrial accident frequency rate has al-
ready been mentioned but at the same time there was 
a significant fall in the severity rate and a very sharp 
drop of almost 40%  in  commuting accidents, which 
were not covered by the competition. C'est dangereux, un feuillard! Pfouh! 
Dangerous things the banding on coils-Ugh! 
There we are  Zing 
Dis, Lingot!? 
T'aurais pas vu le 
feuillard que j'ai 
negligemment laisse 
trainer? Pour Ia securite 
des copains j'aimerais 
le retrouver. 
Faire et 
defaire c'est 
toujours 
travailler ... 
OOPS 
Camelote de 
Camelote 
Of all the stupid things 
What a silly ass ...  ?! 
Voila ce que 
c;:a rapporte 
d'etre 
honnete. 
Hey!  Have you seen the banding!  I left lying around by any  You  really  learn  something  That's  what  comes of being 
chance? I'd like to find it for the sake of my mates' safety!  working with these lads  honest 
Extract from Gaffe a  Sol mer, by C. Jacot with the collaboration of Franquin 
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<0  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 In Mr Vidal's view: 
'It is reasonable to suppose that every industrial acci· 
dent will henceforth be  discussed among the group 
members. Safety has at last become a subject of con· 
cern for the whole workforce. It has been possible to 
change  the  attitude  of the  workforce  to  safety.  As 
soon as the effectiveness of the current competition 
begins to decline, a new idea will have to be found to 
ensure  that  the  workforce  continues  to  talk  about 
safety and to practise self-help in this field.' 
At the same time, a number of working parties were 
set  up  with  a  view  to  the  improvement  of working 
conditions, but this is a different experiment, which 
we shall describe in a later issue. 
Noise in  rolling mills 
Tho following text has been prepared by tho working party 'Health In rolling mills' of 
tho Stool Industry Safety and Health Commission and adopted by this Commission 
on 9 July 1982. 
1. General observations 
There are many sources of noise in rolling mills and 
the sound pressure levels attained frequently justify 
the taking of preventive measures as noise may have 
various effects on human beings. 
An  acute  auditory  trauma  provoking  immediate  le· 
sions may be due to short exposure to exceptionally 
loud noise. 
Occupational loss of hearing is a permanent lack of 
auditory acuity resulting from  repeated  exposure to 
excessive noise levels at the workplace; it can be con· 
sidered as an occupational illness in respect of which 
compensation has to be paid according to the statut-
ory requirements of the country concerned. 
Several  organizations and  research workers have at· 
tempted to establish acceptable threshold values for 
these risks and effects. This research has given rise to 
a number of standards and  recommendations which 
can only be mentioned here. 
The most important are listed hereunder: 
-Standard ISO R 1999 - Acoustics - Assessment 
of occupational exposure to noise with a view to 
the protection of hearing (also AFNOR NF S 31013); 
-Order on  Workplaces  (Arbeitsstatten-Verordnung 
Arbstatt V) of 20 March 1975 (FR of Germany); 
- Ministry of Public Health Technical Committee on 
Noise (France); 
- CHABA  standard  (Committee  on  Hearing  Bio· 
acoustics and Biomechanics, USA); 
-American Conference of Governmental  Industrial 
Hygienists'  proposed  Threshold  Limit  Value  for 
noise (USA); 
- Code of practice for reducing the exposure of em· 
ployed  persons  to noise (Department  of Employ-
ment, UK); 
- Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Standards  for 
general  industry  (OSHA,  Department  of  Labor, 
USA); 
- Occupational  noise exposure (Rules  and  Regula· 
tlons) USA  - Federal Register, Vol. 46,  No 11, Fri· 
day, 16 January 1981). 
According to these standards, or recommendations, 
there  are  variations  between  85  dBA  and  90  dBA 
where  problems of occupational  hearing  loss could 
arise. 
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Furthermore,  some  authors believe  that even  below 
this threshold  noise can  have  repercussions on  the 
neurovegetative, endocrine and nervous systems and 
on  the major physical functions (respiration, circula· 
tion,  digestion and metabolism). According to these 
research workers noise in Industry can: 
- dull the senses, 
- increase reaction time, 
- adversely affect the field of vision, particularly as 
regards the depth of this field, 
- cause somnolence, 
- give rise to irritability which can adversely affect 
the quality of team work, 
-give the impression of having a dry throat or being 
thirsty. 
It must, however, also be borne in mind that noise in· 
terferes  with  speech  communication and  may even 
render  it impossible with a consequent  risk of inci-
dents and accidents, that it impairs mental concentra· 
tion, that it gives rise to additional fatigue in workers 
and, lastly, that the compensation paid out in respect 
of occupational loss of hearing may constitute a sub· 
stantial economic burden for the community at large. 
It  is  important  to  note that  sound  levels  may vary 
greatly from  works to works because of the service 
conditions of machines  operating  in  the  no-load  or 
loaded  conditions, the concentration of such mach· 
ines,  the  proximity  of  other  departments,  the  exi· 
stence of sound-absording  partitions, the degree of 
sound dampening of machinery and plant, etc. In fact, 
each shop is a special case which must be treated as 
such. 
Effective noise control  involves the following meas-
ures: 
1.1. Identification of the sources of noise by measure-
ment of the sound pressure level, any machine or 
plant generating a level in excess of the tolerance 
limit being regarded as suspect and all the more 
so if the figure measured is higher. 
1.2. Subsequent  determination  of the  most suitable 
preventive  measure  or measures  for the protec· 
tion  of the  workers  from  the  harmful effects of 
noise (if necessary on the basis of a frequency an· 
alysis of the noise in question). 
Possible preventive measures fall Into four cate· 
gories: 1.2.1. Noise reduction at source, e.g.: 
- limiting Impact noise: 
•  speed of impact, 
•  absorption of impact, 
•  extent of drop; 
- quieter plant and equipment: 
•  weight, 
•  speed of movement, 
•  use of appropriate materials; 
-silencers on inlets and outlets; 
-elimination of metal·to-metal friction; 
- improvement of servicing and lubrication. 
1.2.2. Reduction of the sound pressure level radiating 
by absorbing the noise as close as possible to 
its source, e.g.: 
- positioning  of  the  noisier plant  and  equip-
ment in  unoccupied places or in special en-
closures; 
-total or partial sealing-off of noisy areas in or-
der to forestall  acoustic pollution of neigh-
bouring areas;  · 
- installation of insulating partitions or panels. 
1.2.3. Reduction  of the  sound  pressure  level  at  the 
workers' ears, e.g.: 
- installation of  sound-proofed  operator cab-
Ins; 
- installation of insulating partitions or panels; 
- keeping  the  sources  of  noise  away  from 
structural parts of the premises; 
- introduction of a rotation system for work in 
noisy and less-noisy areas. 
1.2.4. Lastly, for want of better solutions, operatives 
should wear personal protection equipment (hel-
mets, ear plugs, etc.) 
The  different categories of measures  may be  com-
bined, e.g. a worker assigned to a control cabin should 
wear a personal protective device whenever he leaves 
the operator's cabin. 
Remedial measures are often costly and do not 
always produce the desired result. Just as for 
any other nuisance at the place of work,  the 
noise problem must therefore be taken into ac-
count at the design  and/or ordering  stage of 
machine, premises, work stations and in work 
organization. 
1.3. Estimation of the exposure to noise of workers lia-
ble to suffer occupational loss of hearing despite 
the measures taken. Reference should be made in 
this connection  to  standard  ISO  R  1999,  which 
describes a method of carrying out such an  esti· 
mate on  the basis of the sound  level  and  noise 
duration (equivalent continuous sound level) and 
the percentage of persons who may be  expected 
to suffer hearing loss induced solely by occupa-
tional exposure to noise. This standard also pro-
vides a method of calculating the equivalent con-
tinuous sound level when personal ear defenders 
are worn. 
1.4. If a worker is still at risk despite all the preventive 
measures taken, the only way in which he can be 
protected Is to organize his work in such a manner 
that the effect of a noisy environment can be miti· 
gated by periods of work or rest in a quiet place so 
that the equivalent continuous sound level does 
not exceed the permissible threshold. 
Appropriate medical examination and supervision 
of the hearing of workers exposed to high noise 
levels should be provided. 
2. Noise abatement 
Numerous research projects and tests have been un-
dertaken to reduce  noise, or provision of protection 
against it, with varying degrees of success. It is essen-
tial before changes, which may be costly, are carried 
out that reference should be made to such findings. 
More  often  than  not,  most  of  the  noise  problems 
which arise in rolling mills can be solved satisfactorily 
only by specialists, for although the identification of 
the measures needed  is a fairly straightforward pro-
cess,  the choice of insulating or sound-dampening 
materials and of the design of the absorption system 
depends not only on the type of problem and the rele-
vant  environment,  but  also  and  especially  on  the 
characteristics of the source of noise. Each problem 
must therefore be  tackled separately and a solution 
which proves effective on one item of equipment will 
not necessarily be equally effective on another item of 
equipment of the same kind (e.g. a silencer which is 
suited to one fan may or may not be suited to another 
which is identical but is used in different conditions). 
Furthermore, when the list of Improvements is drawn 
up in order of priority, due account should be taken of 
the frequency of the tasks carried out by operatives In 
the vicinity of the noise source. It is far more urgent to 
deal with the sources of noise near which operatives 
are frequently required to work than those situated in 
places where they are not required for any length of 
time. 
Below is a list of the improvements possible on exces-
sively noisy plant and equipment common in  rolling 
mills. 
2.  1. Fans 
- installations of fans outside the shops (taking 
due account of neighbouring premises) or in 
cellars; 
- installation of fans on suitable shock absorb-
ers; 
- regular balancing of the wheel; 
- installation of silencers; 
- installation  of  a  sound-Insulating  enclosure 
around the fan; 
- installation of elastic washers on the flanges 
between fans and pipes. 
2.  2. Pipework 
- Installation of elastic washers and shock ab· 
sorbing supports to pipework. 
2.  3. Burners 
- frequent  checking  of  the  regulation  of  the 
flame. 
2.  4. Rolling stands 
- choice of low noise elements of drive trans-
mission; 
- use of synthetic materials where possible in 
transmission drives; 
-frequent  maintenance  of  the  elements  of 
transmission; 
11 -good balancing of the spindles; 
-on  small mills, soundproof enclosures for the 
reducer gears; 
- the  introduction of automatic servomechan-
isms. 
2.  5. Roller tables 
- Independent operation of each roller; 
- regular overhauling of the mechanisms. 
2.  6. Sprays 
- soundproofing of the spray hoods. 
2.  7. Flame-scarfing 
-soundproofing of the automatic flame-scarf-
ing bays. 
2.  8. Shearing 
- raising to head height of the parapets over the 
crop end pits. 
2.  9.  Hot and cold sawing, cooling beds and straight· 
eners 
- suitable design of teeth for saw blades; 
- protective covering for the saw blades; 
- preference for walking beam or chain cooling 
beds which avoid scraping. 
2.1 0. Goiters 
- use of easily movable sound-absorbing 
screens; 
- banding of coils by automatic machines. 
2.11. Pickling, straightening and shearing lines 
-covering of roller tables with synthetic mat-
erials; 
-soundproofing for drive mechanisms; 
-automatic system for braking the coil being 
uncoiled; 
-positioning of pinch rollers covered with plas-
tics  upstream  and  downstream  of the  trim-
mers. 
2.12. Handling of materials 
- use  of packing/unpacking  systems  whereby 
handling noises can be reduced. 
3. General preventive measures 
3.1. Measurement  of  equivalent  continuous  sound 
level 
Many operatives  in  rolling mills are  given  tasks 
which expose them to noise levels which vary con· 
slderably in time, either because the rolling or fin-
ishing operations are discontinuous, or because 
the  workers are  required  to move  from  place to 
place within the shop, e.g. from the control station 
to the production shop and vice versa. 
This Is a fundamental consideration in that it war-
rants measurement of the equivalent continuous 
sound level  in the majority of work stations (see 
1.3.  above)  because of the different tasks to be 
carried out there. 
When  this  measurement  exceeds  the  tolerance 
limit It is  necessary to consider preventive mea-
sures such as the ones outlined in  1.2. and  pos-
sibly 1.4., should be implemented. 
3.2. Personal ear defenders 
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Tho use of personal protective equipment is thus 
essential in  many cases,  for wearing this equip-
ment will limit the risk during those periods of ex-
posure to excessively high noise levels. 
The choice of an ear defender is of considerable 
importance for it must at the same time: 
- attenuate the noise in tho Inner ear; 
- allow for verbal communication; 
- cause no undue discomfort to the worker. 
There are several types of defender on the market 
and  their capacity for reducing  noise  and  their 
standard of comfort vary considerably. 
Generally  speaking,  all  rolling  mill  operatives 
(apart from those permanently in soundproof cab-
ins)  should  be  equipped  with  ear  defenders.1 
However, it is equally essential to convince wor-
kers of the need to wear them and to see that this 
instruction is followed. The risk of occupational 
hearing loss is insidious and lack of auditory acu-
ity  becomes  apparent  only  after  a  number  of 
years. This number varies, but the higher the noise 
levels to which a worker is exposed, the sooner 
his hearing is affected. 
In  addition, ear defenders other than the dispos-
able  type  should  be  hygienically  cleaned  and 
maintained at regular intervals. 
3.3. Soundproof cabins 
Soundproof  cabins  are  essential  in  view of tho 
high levels of noise originating in some of the vari-
ous rolling and finishing operations, and their use 
should be more widespread so that as many of the 
control stations as possible are shielded acousti· 
cally. 
Soundproof  cabin  design  parameters  must  in-
clude  not  only  the  characteristics  of  ambient 
noise (tho choice of sound-dampening materials 
is very important) but also other factors such as: 
- protection against dangerous splashes and ex-
cessive radiant heat and light; 
- air conditioning; 
- accessibility; 
- visibility outwards; 
- Interior lighting (variable  reflection-free  light· 
In g). 
For those workers in areas of levels of noise in ex-
cess  of the tolerable  limit, and  who cannot per-
form their work within soundproof cabins, a noise-
free  facility  should  be  provided  for  use  at  rest 
periods or whenever the work task permits. 
'See document 'Adoption and regular use of Individual means of pro-
tection'. Gasholders 
Tho following text has been prepared by tho working party 'Safety. Gas lines' of the 
Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission and adopted by this Commission. 
1. General remarks 
A large number of sometimes very serious accidents 
may be  attributed to gasholders, which  has caused 
the public authorities of some countries to draw up 
pertinent regulations and manufacturers to lay down 
directives. 
The  same attitude has led  the Steel  Industry Safety 
and Health Commission to draft the following recom-
mendations on gasholders in iron and steel undertak· 
lngs, as a result of experience acquired in this indus· 
try. 
2. Types of gasholders 
Gasholders  may be  subdivided  into two main  cate-
gories:  waterless  gasholders  and  water-sealed  gas-
holders. 
Depending  on  the  type,  waterless  gasholders  are 
made gas-tight either with a grease seal (circular gas-
holders), or with an oil seal (polygonal gasholders) or 
else with a canvas seal (circular gasholders). 
All water-sealed gasholders are circular, but may be 
subdivided  according to their guidance system (co-
lumn guided or spiral guided) and the number of lifts. 
3. Recommendations  on  the  construe· 
tion of gasholders 
3.1. Location 
Gasholders must be  located at a sufficient distance 
from houses, workshops belonging to the undertaking 
or neighbouring  undertakings  and  public  thorough· 
fares (road and rail). They should also be located at a 
sufficient distance from sources of heat (e.g. flares) or 
cooling towers (on account of the additional risk of ice 
formation in their proximity). Lastly, there should be a 
reasonable  distance  between  neighbouring  gas-
holders, whether they contain different gases or the 
same gas. 
Gasholders  must be  installed  in  restricted  areas  to 
which access is prohibited to all non-authorized per· 
sons. This prohibition should be indicated by approp· 
riate signs, or as is the case in some works, by a wire 
fence. The latter should have at least two exits, placed 
as  discernibly as possible depending on local condi· 
tions and prevailing winds. 
Access  roads  must  allow  fire  tenders  and  rescue 
workers to reach the gasholders. 
3.2. Extreme positions of gasholders' lifts or pistons 
-danger of excessive high or low pressure 
In order to prevent gasholders' lifts or pistons reach· 
lng their extreme upper or lower positions, two sepa· 
rate automatic systems should progressively close off 
the valves allowing gas to leave the gasholder (for the 
lower position) and the supply valves to the gasholder 
(for the upper position) so that the valves concerned 
are  completely closed  before  these  extreme  points 
are  reached.  The  same  effect  should  be  obtained 
when there is only a single main for supplying and dis· 
tributing the gas. These systems should also set off 
visual and audible alarms at the control station and 
will thus present the highest possible level of safety. 
Furthermore, to prevent excessive pressures in  gas· 
holders,  emergency gas  vents,  which  automatically 
come into operation when the piston or the lift reach· 
es  its highest point, should be  provided and  kept in 
operational order at all times. 
3.3. Shut-off devices 
The devices to close off the supply pipe to the gas-
holder and the distribution pipe must be designed to 
provide the maximum sealing possible and be quick to 
operate. They must be  remote controlled, with facil· 
ities for manual operation if necessary. To  allow for 
maintenance on the gasholder in gas-free conditions, 
it is advisable to use a goggle valve to provide effec-
tive isolation, such a valve always being preferable to 
two consecutive valves with intermediate venting. 
3.4. Permanent recording systems 
A dual permanent recording and Indicating system to 
indicate the position of the lift or piston should be fit· 
ted to each gasholder to allow readings of the piston 
speed or lift movements and the volume of gas in the 
holder. Gas pressure should also be measured at the 
same time. 
3.5. Signalling and operating information 
The separate automatic systems regulating the valves 
to and from the gasholder to give warning of the ap-
proach of the venting condition or of the extreme posi· 
tions of the piston should be  connected, as mentio· 
ned In 3.2., to an alarm at the control station. The sig· 
nal,  which should be  visual and  audible, must warn 
the service staff to carry out operations that the situa-
tion requires so as to avoid at all times the extreme 
positions being reached  or,  above all, the gas vents 
being activated. 
Furthermore, in some regions and according to local 
conditions, Information on the speed and direction of 
wind  should  be  obtained,  especially before  certain 
maintenance work and checks are undertaken. 
A recording device is being developed to measure the 
tilt of pistons or lifts with sufficient accuracy. 
3.6. Electrical installations 
All electrical Installations providing lighting or power 
installed Inside gasholders, on  domes or supporting 
structures or inside the restricted area should be  of 
flameproof design. Portable or hand-held equipment 
and their power supply lines used in the same places 
should also be  flameproof and of the prescribed low 
voltage. 
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the holder or lantern should be  effectively bonded to 
the surrounding steelwork at the point of entry. This 
also applies to any earthed conductor. 
3.7. Protection from lightning strikes 
The  fixed and  movable parts of the gasholder struc· 
ture should be earthed. 
Gas  vent stacks should not project above the top of 
the  holder, in order to minimize the possibility of a 
stack acting as a lightning conductor. They should be 
securely bonded to structures to eliminate the danger 
of sparks. 
Radio aerials or other non-essential projections must 
not be erected on gasholders. 
Metal suspension cables and equalizer leads on gas· 
holders must not pass too high above the roofs where 
they may be In danger of being struck by lightning. 
Telephone and power lines must not be supported by 
or attached to gasholders. 
3.8. Access to the various parts of gasho/ders 
Every gasholder should have two access points to the 
various platforms and  inspection areas,  to allow for 
speedy evacuation at all times. These access points 
should  be  set  opposite  each  other  and  prevailing 
winds should be taken into account when deciding on 
locations. They should consist of stairs and not verti· 
cal ladders. Attention is drawn to the fact that these 
stairs must be designed to allow for persons on stret-
chers to be  easily carried. In  tall gas holders, stairs 
should preferably be replaced by a lift. The possibility 
of installing a cradle for inspecting the outer surface 
should be examined at the design stage. 
A chamber  which  can  be  pressurized  and  supplied 
with clean air may be Installed on  the roofs of gas· 
holders to provide on-the-spot emergency treatment 
for gassed workers. 
3.9. Protection against freezing 
All  gasholders and  especially the water-sealed  type 
must  bo  protected  against  the  effects  of  freezing. 
Steam for example may be  used to provide sufficient 
heat for water seals. During cold weather there must 
be special monitoring of water temperature. 
In  connection  with  the  water  in  water-sealed  gas· 
holders,  it should  be  noted  that  its level  of acidity 
must be  monitored. The danger of corrosion may be 
diminished by adding a corrosion inhibitor to the wa· 
ter. 
3.10. Fire precautions 
All naked flames must be strictly prohibited in the re· 
stricted area around gasholders (see 3.1.); smoking in 
particular should  be  forbidden.  Written  instructions 
and  notices  posted  in  sufficient number  should  be 
provided to remind all persons of these regulations. 
A system for Introducing Inert gas below the piston in 
sufficient quantity into each  gasholder through two 
diametrically opposite inlets should be  installed and 
be permanently operational. 
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Sufficient quantities of water for fire fighting or cool· 
lng purposes must be available. 
4. Operating and maintenance  procedures 
4.1. Inspections, checks and maintenance 
A complete procedure must be set down for all main· 
tenance  checks and  Inspections, to be  carried  out, 
both frequently (weekly for example) and periodically 
(overhaul),  Including Inspection to check the normal 
wear and tear and corrosion of gasholders (e. g. yearly 
or two-yearly). 
Detailed reports should be  made of all  maintenance 
work and  plant inspections, indicating their purpose 
and the equipment inspected by means of checklists 
which should be filled in by the responsible person as 
the Inspection proceeds. 
4.2. A register should be kept for every gasholder and 
all  maintenance work,  repairs and  modifications, as 
well  as  the  results  of  all  checks  and  inspections, 
should be entered Into it. Each entry should be dated 
and signed by the person carrying out or responsible 
tor the work done. 
4.3. No welding or cutting must be done in the restric· 
ted zone around gasholders (see 3.1.) unless a proce· 
dure for granting a 'fire permit' has been  laid down. 
This should Include all job instructions, precautions 
to be taken and the name(s) of the person(s) in charge. 
4.4. Maintenance staff should not be  authorized ac-
cess to gasholder roofs unless there are at least two 
persons and they have a permit to carry out work is· 
sued by the person in charge of the gas holder, and af· 
ter the required measures have been taken. 
4.5. Work of a non-urgent nature must not be undertak· 
en on or in a gasholder when thunder or storm condi· 
tions - or the danger of one of these - exist. 
4.6. When work is being carried out underneath bells 
or pistons, they should be  secured  to prevent them 
falling onto personnel. 
4.7. The  resistance of the earthing conductors must 
be monitored at least annually; where stricter regula-
tions do not exist, the resistance must not exceed 10 
ohms. These measurements should be entered in the 
register (see 4.2.). 
4.8. When  gasholders are  taken  out of service,  they 
should be isolated and purged in accordance with the 
recommendations in the document 'Maintenance and 
repair work to gas lines and  equipment - isolation 
and degassing of gas lines and equipment' ('Travaux 
d'entretien et de reparations des conduites et appa· 
reils a gaz - Isolation et degazage des conduites et 
appareils') which was published as part of the conclu· 
slons of the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commis· 
sian. 
4.9. Adequate  breathing  apparatus  should  be  pro· 
vided, checked regularly and carried by the personnel 
whenever work is done on gasholders. Readers' letters 
The  aim  of this  feature  is  to enable  readers  to  ex-
change information. It is open to anyone seeking in-
formation on a particular practical problem, and also 
to  anyone  who  can  supply  this  information.  Other 
contributions  describing  a  particularly  successful 
experiment or project with novel features will also be 
accepted. 
Readers are asked to address their correspondence to 
the Secretariat of the Steel Industry Safety and Health 
Commission, Information Bulletin, DG V, Commission 
of the  European  Communities, BP  1907,  L-2920  Lux-
embourg. 
The Bulletin's editorial committee will decide whether 
it is appropriate and practicable to publish replies to 
questions and other contributions submitted. In  any 
event replies will be sent direct to the questioner con-
cerned. 
*  * 
* 
Letter of a reader 
Problem with operating 
a blast furnace clay gun 
For each plugging operation, the gun is filled with 12 
to 15 packets of taphole clay, each of which weighs 
approximately 20 kg  and measures 19 x 14.5 x 38 em. 
The total amount cannot be  inserted in a single oper-
ation and about six stages are necessary. After each 
filling operation, the material has to be compacted by 
the piston. The  packets of taphole clay are  inserted 
through the round or square opening in the clay gun. 
The opening has a cover which must be closed (block-
ed) for the plugging operation. The opening, however, 
is not closed with the cover for the compacting pro-
cess.  The  considerable  effort  required  to  close  the 
opening for this process (weight of the cover, stiffness 
of the hinges, ergonomically unsuitable posture of the 
worker) would make this work intolerable. Since the 
taphole gun is operated hydraulically, it would be very 
difficult and has so far not been usual, to close the un-
protected  opening  securely  by  locking  or  other 
means. 
The  filling operation is generally carried out by  two 
persons, one of which does the manual work on  the 
machine while the second, at the machine's control 
panel about 9 m away, operates the clay gun accord-
Ing to the first person's instructions. 
Any misinterpretation in the communication between 
these two persons may cause a serious accident and 
we  have  recorded the case of a worker who had his 
hand crushed  in  the machine, as  a consequence of 
which the hand had to be amputated. 
In order to improve safety in the operation of this type 
of equipment, reports would be welcomed from other 
readers  on  means  of  securing  the  opening  during 
compacting without obstructing the machine's oper-
ating area. 
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